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NOMINAL CONCEPTUALISM
AND LOGICAL MODELLING OF AGENTS’ CONCEPTIONS
Abstract. In the view of my philosophical position ‘nominal conceptualism’, cognitive/knowledge
agents, who are in some way aware of expressing the world based on their mental concepts,
deal with their linguistic and/or symbolic expressions. In this paper I rely on nominal concep-
tualism to logically characterise agents’ concept-based descriptions of the world and analyse a
fundamental logical system for conception representation.
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1. From Concepts to Conceptions
Over the years, the term concept has been used differently by many philosophers, cog-
nitive scientists, and computer scientists. In my view (see Badie 2017a, 2017b, 2017c,
2020a, 2020b), concepts are mental (and non-physical) entities that are construed by
cognitive, or knowledge, ‘agents’ in a particular state of awareness. Concepts can be
interpreted to be produced based on (i) agents’ conceptualisation of the world, and on
(ii) their linguistic interactions (with other agents as well as with themselves). It is
remarkable that both (i) and (ii) require some degree of awareness.
This research draws on nominal conceptualism (see Badie 2020a, 2020b) which
is developed based on the fundamental positions conceptualism and nominalism. In
particular, conceptualism sees concepts some ‘mental’ phenomena that are construed
by human beings. In addition, nominalism posits that concepts do not really exist.
According to nominalism, the only things that really exist are linguistic expressions;
see (Allwood 1999).
In my view, agents’ mental concepts are identifiable with specific contents in linguis-
tic and symbolic expressions. Moreover, agents’ descriptions of the world are identifi-
able with agents’ mental representations. Summing up nominal conceptualism, agents,
who are in some way aware of expressing their own descriptions of the world based on
their mental concepts, deal with their expressions (that are spoken, written, and repre-
sented based on, e.g., letters, symbols). In more proper words, human beings need to
become concerned with the production of their conceptions of the world. Thereby, in
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my theoretical model, conceptions are the consequences of concepts. It is an underly-
ing hypothesis of nominal conceptualism that the most fundamental building blocks of
agents’ descriptions of the world are expressible based on their ‘conceptions’. In such
a framework, the phenomenon of meaning can be regarded as a function from one’s
pre-conceptions into their conceptions (and, in fact, from their conceptions into their
conceptions’ updated forms). Interpreting ‘meaning’ a conception-update function, any
meaning would be a dynamic conceptual structure (based on the conceptual entities
‘conception’) that becomes updated over time.
In this paper I refocus on my research in (Badie 2017a, 2020a, 2020b) and on
(Baader et al. 2017) in order to logically (a) characterise agents’ concept-based de-
scriptions of the world, and (b) analyse a fundamental logical system for conception
representation.
2. Logical Analysis of Conceptions
For the logical assessment of conceptions, any conception 𝒞 and its interconnections
with other conceptions can—by means of predication2—be represented by symbols. In
order to analyse some agent’s conceptions logically, we can utilise the triple ⟨conception,
singular, effect⟩; see the formal-logical system 𝒞ℒ in (Badie 2020a). More specifically:
1. A conception (of a concept), or 𝒞, is correlated with a distinct [conceptual] entity.
For example, John’s conception of the concept Book can be interpreted to have a
correlation with a conceptual entity in his mind.
2. A singular, or 𝑠, is an instance of a conception (of a concept). Any ‘𝑠’ is capa-
ble of being mapped into itself (by means of the reference ‘𝒞’ under which 𝑠 has
been classified). For example, John’s conception of apology (that is an instance of
his conception of the concept Book) is a singular. Note that John’s conception of
apology is classifiable under (and can be labelled by) his own conception of Book.
By his own semantic interpretation, John transforms ‘apology’ into his own con-
ception of the concept Book. Moreover, the singular apology can be [semantically]
mapped into itself (by means of John’s conception of Book).
3. An effect (of a conception of a concept C), or ℰ, expresses a relationship between
some specific ‘𝑠’ (which is conceptualised, by some agent, to be the instance of C)
and other singulars (which are conceptualised, by that agent, to be the instances of
either C or of any other concept in the world). For example, John’s conceptions of
writingA–Book and of readingA–Book are two effects (based on his own conception of
the concept Book). In addition, an effect (of a conception (𝒞) of a concept (C)) has
the ability to assign a property/attribute to some ‘𝑠’ (which is classified under C). For
2The predication of 𝒞 is concerned with what we need/want to state about 𝒞.
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example, John’s conceptions of beingScientific–Book and of havingIntelligentAuthor–
Book are some other effects of his conception of Book.
It shall be summarised that one’s (1) conception(s) of some concept C, (2) concep-
tion(s) of the instance(s) of C, and (3) conception(s) of the effect(s) of their concep-
tion(s) of C are the most fundamental descriptions from which human beings, induc-
tively, build more-specified as well as complex C-based descriptions. Note that (1), (2),
and (3) do not independently have any logical consequence in a logical description. In
fact, we need to utilise logical operators in order to achieve logical consequences.
3. Conceptions & Fundamental World Descriptions
Let John express the descriptions ‘Apology is a book.’ and ‘Plato is an author.’. Actu-
ally John has conceptualised that the singulars apology and plato are the instances
of his conceptions of the concepts Book and Author, respectively. According to the
description ‘Plato is an author.’, John has semantically interpreted that the singular
plato is an instance of his conception of the concept Author. Note that John’s de-
scriptions ‘Apology is a book.’ and ‘Plato is an author.’ are expressed based on the
effects of valence-1. Any effect of valence-1 can be described by ‘is a’ in an agent’s
description. Actually the term ‘is a’ can express the concept of ‘being’.
Now let John express the description ‘Apology is written by Plato.’. Here John
has conceptualised that the singulars apology and plato are relatable to each other
by means of writingA–Book (that is an effect of his conceptions of the concepts Book
and Author). According to John’s description ‘Apology is written by Plato.’, John
has semantically interpreted that the singulars apology and plato are—collectively
and coherently—expressible under his conception of the effect writingA–Book. Note
that the description ‘Apology is written by Plato.’ is expressed based on the effect of
the valence-2. According to ‘Apology is written by Plato.’, the singulars apology and
plato (that are the instances of John’s conceptions of the concepts Book and Author,
respectively) are conceptualised (by John) and understood (by John) to be related to
each other by means of the effect ‘is written by’. Here the singular apology has—by
means of the conception’s effect ‘is written by’—effected the singular plato.
4. Logical Characterisation of Conception Representation
In this section I informally analyse the logical system 𝒞ℒ (see Badie 2020a) in order to
logically characterise conception representation. The main building blocks of 𝒞ℒ are
as follows3.
3The analysed building blocks (of conception representation) are also valid for and expressible in the
representation of conceptions’ effects.
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1. We need to be concerned with how some agent’s conceptions, as well as their con-
ceptions’ effects, can—logically—be constructed. A conception construction is the
production, and the development of, new conceptions based on available conceptions
of the world. Conception constructions are fundamentally produced in the following
forms:
(a) A conception negation that expresses the absence of an available conception
of the world. A negation of a specific conception 𝒞, logically and semantically,
invalidates 𝒞. For example, John’s conceptions of Book and Author would have
their negations (that are, respectively, equivalent to John’s conceptions of the
concepts NOT–Book and NOT–Author)4.
(b) A conception conjunction that produces the coincidence and concurrence of
two, or more, available conceptions of the world. The conjunction of John’s
conceptions of the concepts Book and Author could produce his conception of the
concept Book–AND–Author.
(c) A conception disjunction that separates two, or more, available conceptions of
the world. The disjunction of John’s conception of the concepts Book and Note-
book could produce his conception of the concept Book–OR–Notebook.
(d) A conception quantification that quantificationally assesses and appraises the
available conceptions of the world. Relied on his conception of Book, John can
produce his conceptions of the conceptsALL–Book(s) [in the world] and SOME–
Book(s) [in the world].
2. It shall be taken into account that any conception representation is logically and
semantically correlated with the concepts (A) Existence and Validity, and (B) Non-
Existence and Invalidity. According to John’s conception of the concept Book,
he can produce his conceptions of the concept BEING–Book and of the concept
NOT.BEING–Book. It can be interpreted that agents’ conceptions are seman-
tically interpretable under agents’ conceptions of the logical concepts ‘True’ and
‘False’. This means that agents, by their semantic valuation, become concerned
with the truth (i.e. semantic validity) and the falsity (i.e. semantic invalidity) of
their own conceptions. It shall be summarised that:
(a) John’s TRUTH conception, logically and semantically, conceptualises the va-
lidity, and acceptability, of his conception of the concept Book based on his all
possible interpretations of the concept Book. In fact, John conceptualises and
interprets ‘whether it is true that some specific concept is a book’.
(b) John’s FALSITY conception, logically and semantically, conceptualises the
invalidity, and unacceptability, of his conception of the concept Book based on
4In this section the bold concepts are the fundamental logical concepts in the logical system 𝒞ℒ.
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his all possible interpretations of the concept Book. In fact, he conceptualises and
interprets ‘whether it is false that some specific concept is a book’.
3. Conception classification and, correspondingly, conception identification shall be
taken into consideration. By means of conception classification (and conception
identification), agents categorise their available conceptions of the world (and, ac-
cordingly, identify various singulars). Relied on his conceptualisation of the concept
Book, John may
(a) classify various concepts in his mind (and in any other knowledge base) under
the label ‘BOOK’.
(b) conceptualise and interpret whether some specific singular 𝑠 can be identified
by the label ‘BOOK’.
(c) conceptualise and interpret that his conception of Stone is independent of his
conception of Book.
(d) conceptualise and interpret that his conception of Handbook is subsumed under
his conception of Book.
(e) conceptualise and interpret that his conception of Publication is equivalent to
his conception of Book.
5. Future Research
My future research will develop a formal-logical theory to answer the question of ‘how
agents form and change their conceptions of the world (based on exchanged information
with each other)’. My special focus point will be the conceptual dynamics informed by
conversational exchanges.
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